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STUDIES OF TRANSFER
TRAUMA IN NURSING HOME
PATIENTS: HOW THE
LEGAL SYSTEM HAS
FAILED TO SEE THE WHOLE
PICTURE
Terri D. Kevillet
T O FIND OUT the whole truth we must put all the partstogether. I
I. INTRODUCTION
In an old fable from India, several blind men encounter an ele-
phant, and each examines a separate part in an effort to determine
what the creature is like. Afterwards, each man describes the ele-
phant in radically different terms depending on which part he inves-
tigated. Similarly, by focusing on certain aspects of transfer trauma
data and ignoring others, jurists, legislators, and commentators
have often failed to see the "big picture."
The term "transfer trauma" was coined in the early 1960s when
gerontologists first became concerned that involuntary relocation of
the elderly-either from private residences to institutions or from
one institution to another-might have adverse health effects and
possibly even hasten death. (This phenomenon has also been re-
ferred to as transplantation shock, relocation stress, and relocation
shock, but transfer trauma is the most commonly used term.) Early
studies seemed to furnish scientific evidence that this fear was justi-
fied.2 Some later studies, however, had mixed results, and several
t Associate, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Los Angeles. J.D. 1992, University of South-
ern California Law Center, B.A. 1972, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to express
my sincere appreciation to Deborah Hensler of the Rand Corporation for her comments on
an earlier draft of this Article.
1. THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT (Retold by Lillian Quigley, 1959).
2. See, eg., C. Knight Aldrich & Ethel Mendkoff, Relocation of the Aged and Disabled:
A Mortality Study, 11 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 185 (1963); Norman Bourestom & Sandra
Tars, Alterations in Life Patterns Following Nursing Home Relocation, 14 GERONTOLOGIST
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scientists suggested that the phenomenon was a myth, at least in
regard to increased mortality.'
During the twenty-year period in which most research was done
on this subject, concerns about the welfare of the elderly were also
surfacing in the legal community. As government funding of nurs-
ing home care through Medicare and Medicaid became more com-
mon, and the administering agencies thus acquired the power to
determine the fate of elderly patients, advocates for the rights of
nursing home patients seized on the concept of transfer trauma as a
means of preventing or forestalling unwanted involuntary transfers.
Legal arguments about transfer trauma appear in numerous
cases, including the 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case of O'Bannon v.
Town Court Nursing Center.4 In O'Bannon the Court held that,
notwithstanding possible transfer trauma, nursing home residents
do not have a right to a hearing prior to transfer. Nevertheless,
because the right to a hearing is not the only legal issue associated
with transfer trauma, the phenomenon continues to be a considera-
tion in cases challenging relocation. In addition, transfer trauma
has been a rationale for the adoption of various statutory schemes
addressing relocation.
As the nation's population ages and the number of nursing
home residents increases-the current population of 1.5 million res-
idents is expected to rise to 2.1 million by the year 2000, and to 4.4
million by 2040 5 -issues such as the effect of transfer trauma wili
undoubtedly assume even greater importance. Thus, it is impera-
tive that courts and legislators have a clear understanding of the
transfer trauma phenomenon and its implications for the welfare of
nursing home residents. This paper will review and analyze the
principal published scientific literature on transfer trauma in an ef-
fort to determine what conclusions may legitimately be drawn. The
paper will then critically examine how the scientific data has been
506 (1974) (suggesting that a weighty source of the variance in relocation effects is the degree
of environmental change involved); Kenneth F. Jasnau, Individualized Versus Mass Transfer
of Nonpsychotic Geriatric Patients from Mental Hospitals to Nursing Homes, with Special Ref-
erence to the Death Rate, 15 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 280 (1967); Eldon C. Killian, The
Effect of Geriatric Transfer on Mortality Rate, 15 SOCIAL WORK 19 (1970).
3. See Jerry H. Borup et a., Relocation: Its Effect on Health, Functioning and Mortality
20 GERONTOLOGIST 468 (1980) (finding that health status of elderly patients is not affected
by relocation).
4. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
5. Note, Don't Make Them Leave Their Rights at the Door: A Recommended Model
Statute to Protect the Rights of the Elderly in Nursing Homes, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 321 (1988).
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used by courts and legislators, and offer suggestions for a more all-
encompassing approach.
II. TRANSFER TRAUMA STUDIES
A. " STUDIES ASSERTING THE EXISTENCE OF TRANSFER
TRAUMA
The earliest studies of the effects of relocation on the elderly
involved moves from the community into institutions.6 In addition,
a number of studies have considered the effects of voluntary moves,
for example, into housing for active seniors. Because most of the
subsequent judicial and legislative attention has focused on involun-
tary transfers between institutions, I will concentrate on the studies
addressing that situation.
The first major study to observe the effects of relocation from
one institution to another was that of C. Knight Aldrich and Ethel
Mendkoff conducted in 1963. Aldrich and Mendkoff took advan-
tage of the research opportunity presented by the closure of the Chi-
cago Home for Incurables, which necessitated the relocation of all
of the home's residents for a reason totally unrelated to the state of
their health or family relationships.
The transfers took approximately two years to complete. At the
outset of the research project, 233 persons lived in the home. Fifty-
five of the patients died before they could be relocated. Of the 182
remaining, 163 were dispersed to fifty-six other nursing homes in
the area (all of which were considered equal or superior to the
Home for Incurables), four were hospitalized, six went to live with
friends or relatives, and nine (all under seventy years old) were able
to return to independent living.
Aldrich and Mendkoff determined the death rate within one
year of transfer to be thirty-two percent, with a substantial percent-
age of the deaths occurring in the first three months after transfer.7
Because all of the patients in the home were transferred, it was not
possible to create a control group with which to compare the death
rate of the transferred residents. Therefore, Aldrich and Mendkoff
utilized the baseline method by comparing the death rates for the
6. See e.g. Nelida A. Ferrari, Freedom of Choice, 8 Soc. WORK 105 (1963) (finding a
relationship between the lack of freedom of choice in institutionalization and "unexpected"
death); Morton A. Lieberman, Relationship of Mortality Rates to Entrance to a Home for the
Aged, 16 GEaIATircs 515 (1961) (finding that first year mortality rates in a home for the
aged are related to the impact of institutionalization).
7. Aldrich & Mendkoff, supra note 2, at 187.
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transferees (separate rates were calculated for patients in different
decades of life) with the death rates at the home for the previous ten
years. This comparison indicated that the death rates for all trans-
ferred groups except those in the tenth decade of life were "substan-
tially and significantly higher" than the rates that would have been
anticipated (in the absence of the move) based on the historical
data.' In the first three months after transfer, the death rate for all
patients was more than three times higher than the expected death
rate; after three months it returned to the anticipated level.
In addition to this first comparison of death rates, Aldrich and
Mendkoff also attempted to determine the relationship between a
patient's level of psychological adjustment to the home and mortal-
ity. They found that patients who were classified as psychotic or
near-psychotic had by far the highest death rate, sixty-three per-
cent. The death rate for patients described as neurotic or overtly
depressed was thirty-seven percent; for angry and demanding pa-
tients, seventeen percent; and for satisfactorily adjusted patients,
twelve percent. Even after correction for age disparities, these dif-
ferences were still found to be statistically significant.9
Finally, Aldrich and Mendkoff evaluated the relationship be-
tween mortality and the patients' responses to the news of reloca-
tion (for those who were capable of a discernible reaction). The
responses were divided into six categories: philosophical, angry,
anxious, regression, depression, and denial. None of the philosophi-
cal patients died. The death rates for the other groups were 6% for
the angry group 15% for the anxious group; 27% for the regression
group; 41% for the depression group; and 71% for the denial
group. After correction for age, the differences were still statisti-
cally significant.10
Although they endeavored to do so, Aldrich and Mendkoff were
not able to observe any statistically significant relationship between
anticipation of transfer and mortality. Also, they were unable to
measure the effect of caseworker assistance, but they believed it to
be helpful.
On the basis of their findings, Aldrich and Mendkoff concluded
that relocation in and of itself can have social and psychological
effects that result in increased mortality. They found the patient's
level of psychological adjustment-both prior and subsequent to be-
8. Id.
9. Margin of error less than 2%. Id. at 189.
10. Margin of error less than 5%. Id. at 190.
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ing informed of the transfer-to be a significant factor in predicting
survival. However, they cautioned that because depression has as-
sociated physical symptoms, further study would be needed to de-
termine whether repressed hostility or loss of the will to live can be
fatal.11 Aldrich and Mendkoff recommended that case work or psy-
chiatric help be provided whenever transfer of elderly patients be-
comes necessary, and stressed that efforts to facilitate adaptation to
new surroundings are especially crucial in the first three months
after transfer.
In 1967, Aldrich and Mendkoff's study was praised by another
researcher, Margaret Blenkner, as being the best investigation of re-
location effects to date.12 However, Blenkner cautioned that
"[b]ecause each study tends to use different measures and classifica-
tions for psychological data it is very difficult to arrive at any con-
clusive summary."13 She then expressed a deeper concern that
"such knowledge as we think we have rests on very insecure foun-
dations.... We have cited each other until the evidence sometimes
appears of a better quality than it really is."1 4 She called for further
research.
The next significant published study of geriatric transfers ap-
peared in 1970. Psychiatric social worker Eldon Killian docu-
mented the effects of involuntary transfer on geriatric psychiatric
patients who were moved from Stockton (California) State Hospital
to other facilities. 5 At the time of the study, the hospital facilities
were divided into two separate locations. The North Area had at
one time been operated as a farm that supplied food for the hospital,
and many of the patients housed in the North Area had worked on
the farm. When the acreage on which the farm was located in-
creased substantially in value, it was sold by the state, leaving only
the patient dormitories. Eventually the state decided to sell the re-
maining North Area land and relocate the patients. During the first
11. Id. at 193. In an effort to shed further light on this question, Aldrich examined the
data further by comparing the twenty-six patients who died in the first three months with a
group of surviving patients matched for sex, age, and physical condition (defined by primary
diagnosis, since many patients had multiple disabilities). The results of this analysis were
published the following year. Aldrich concluded that psychological adjustment was a greater
determinant of survival than physical condition. C. Knight Aldrich, Personality Factors and
Mortality in the Relocation of the Aged, 4 GERONTOLOGIST 92 (1964).
12. Margaret Blenkner, Environmental Change and the Aging Individual, 7 GERONTOL-
OGIwT 101, 102 (1967).
13. Id. at 103.
14. Id. at 104-05.
15. Eldon C. Killian, Effect of Geriatric Transfers on Mortality Rates, 15 SoC. WORK 19
(1970).
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three months of 1968, 144 of the North Area patients were trans-
ferred to different state hospitals or other facilities. 16
Killian studied three groups of patients: two groups of transfer-
ees and one group of patients who remained at Stockton during the
study period. All of the subjects were age sixty or older. Group I
consisted of seventy-one men and eight women who were trans-
ported by bus to other state hospitals. Group II included twenty-
one male and forty-four female patients who were transferred to
nursing homes, boarding houses, and "family care homes" (private
homes licensed by the state to care for up to six patients). Forty
percent of the Group II patients were nonambulatory and were
transported by ambulance. The others were taken by automobile.
Group III was comprised of fifty-two men and fifty-seven women
who remained at Stockton during the study period, although some
of them were transferred to other locations within the hospital.
Data was collected on six variables: age, sex, race, organic or func-
tional diagnosis, length of hospitalization since most recent admis-
sion, and whether the patient was ambulatory. 17
Three matched control groups were created using hospital cen-
sus data. For each experimental subject there was a control subject
who shared comparable characteristics based on the six variables.I
A random sample group was also selected from the hospital geriat-
ric census. Mortality data gathered four months after the transfer
revealed that the mortality rate for Group I was 4.98 times higher
than for its matched control group. The Group II mortality rate
was 8.99 times that of its control group. Among the nonambu-
latory Group II patients, nearly 27% died; this finding was statisti-
cally significant at the .023 level. A Chi-square test applied to the
combined data from Groups I and II indicated that the probability
of these deaths occurring by chance was .0005. By contrast, there
was no significant difference in mortality between the Group III pa-
tients and their matched controls.19
Age was the only variable, other than the move itself and
16. Id. at 20.
17. Id. at 21.
18. Ages were matched using five-year ranges, and length-of-stay was divided into inter-
vals of less than one year, one to four years, five to ten years, to nineteen years, and twenty
years and over. Because of the specific characteristics used, the relatively small size of the
pool, and the blind matching procedure used, there were eleven patients (4.35%) who turned
out to be both experimental and control subjects. These patients were included in the study
even though they could not properly serve as controls because they were relocated. Id. at 24-
25.
19. Id. at 25.
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whether the patient was ambulatory, that showed any statistically
significant relation to mortality. The mean age of the patients from
Groups I and II who died was ten years higher than the mean age
for Group I and eight years higher than the mean age for Group
H1.2" However, Killian relates some anecdotal evidence suggesting
that patient attitudes-which were not systematically examined-
may have been a factor. Many of the patients became distressed as
they observed the buildings that had already been evacuated being
demolished or burned; they feared that they were going to be
burned along with the dormitories. One eighty-year-old man who
had lived at the farm for thirty years became depressed when he
realized that he would have to move. He was found dead clutching
a bunch of carrots from his garden. Another elderly man who
steadfastly denied that he was to be transferred died in the ambu-
lance as he was being moved.21
In 1971, Markus, Blenkner, Bloom, and Downs published a
study of two sets of relocations from old downtown nursing homes
in Cleveland and Washington, D.C. to new suburban facilities.22
They compared post-transfer mortality rates with anticipated rates
calculated from data covering the previous fifteen years for each
home. They observed some increased mortality-for example, the
rate was 1.5 times higher than anticipated for male residents of the
Cleveland home and 1.63 times higher for women in the Washing-
ton home-but this effect was not universal. Female residents of
the Cleveland home experienced a decrease in mortality after the
transfer.23 Deviations from anticipated mortality varied by age
grouping. The authors speculate that inconsistencies in the data
may have been due to differences in admission policies, both be-
tween the two homes, and between normal and pre-relocation poli-
cies (that is, for one or two months prior to the planned relocation,
the homes may have cut back on convalescent admissions). No at-
tempt was made in this study to gather data on the patients' physi-
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 26. Recall that in Aldrich and Mendkoff's study, denial was highly correlated
with increased mortality. See Aldrich & Mendkoff, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
In a subsequent unpublished study of the closing of Modesto State Hospital, researchers
also found increased mortality. Patients who were physically frail or psychologically im-
paired were most likely to die. R.A. Marlow, When They Closed the Doors at Modesto,
Presented at National Mental Health Conference on the Closure of State Hospitals (Feb. 14-
15, 1974), cited in Richard Schulz & Gail Brenner, Relocation of the Aged: A Review and
Theoretical Analysis, 32 J. GERONTOLOGY 323, 327 (1977).
22. Elliot Markus et al., The Impact of Relocation upon Mortality Rates of Institutional-
ized Aged Persons, 26 J. GERONTOLOGY 537 (1971).
23. Id. at 538.
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cal condition, nor on their mental states and attitudes, which the
researchers acknowledge may be better predictors of mortality than
the variables they documented: age, sex, and length of residency.24
In light of the above research (and other studies documenting
adverse effects on newly institutionalized and voluntarily trans-
ferred patients) several studies were conducted which presumed that
relocation might cause increased mortality.25 In at least two such
studies, the researchers attempted to determine whether this phe-
nomenon could be prevented by proper preparation of the patients
prior to transfer. The transferred patients in these research projects
actually experienced a decrease in mortality rate.26 Another study
found no significant difference in mortality between the transferred
and nontransferred patients, but the researchers were uncertain as
to what factors had produced this result.2
B. STUDIES DENYING THAT INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS CAUSE
INCREASED MORTALITY
While many researchers became convinced that involuntary
transfer could have serious and even fatal adverse effects on geriat-
ric patients, other scientists reported findings that did not support
this view. For example, a 1974 article by Elizabeth Markson and
John Cumming describes their observations regarding the transfers
of 2,174 mental patients, of whom 494 were over age sixty-five, to
different facilities within the New York State mental health sys-
tem.2" According to the authors, the mortality rate of the trans-
ferred patients did not increase. However, the methodology of this
study was not especially rigorous. There was no control group set
up with which to compare the transferred patients, 29 so their mor-
24. Id. at 540.
25. Madalon Amenta et al., Successful Relocation of Elderly Residents, 5 GERIATRIC
NURSING 356 (1984); Evelyn H. Ogren & Margaret W. Linn, Male Nursing Home Patients:
Relocation and Mortality, 19 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y 229 (1971); J.P. Zweig & J.Z. Czank,
Effects of Relocation on Chronically Ill Geriatric Patients of a Medical Unit: Mortality Rates,
23 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 132 (1975).
26. Amenta et al., supra note 25, at 358 (decline in death rate of transferees, measured
by baseline method, from 17% in 1980 to 11% for first half of 1981); Zweig & Czank, supra
note 25, at 135 (6.82% drop in death rate of the discharged and transferred patients; margin
of error less than 5%).
27. Ogren & Linn, supra note 25.
28. Elizabeth W. Markson & John H. Cumming, A Strategy of Necessary Mass Transfer
and Its Impact on Patient Mortality, 29 J. GERONTOLOGY 315 (1974).
29. The authors did subsequently compare the transferred patients with small groups of
healthy geriatric patients, some in mental hospitals and some in outpatient programs. The
mortality rate for the transferred patients was 9.1%; while that of the nontransferred chronic
geriatric patients was 8.6%, a statistically insignificant difference. The outpatient group
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tality rate was compared with that of new geriatric admissions to
the system during the time period of the study, and with the death
rate for all chronic geriatric patients. There are obvious flaws in
these comparisons based on differences between the compared
groups as described by the authors. The transferred patients had
been hospitalized for an average of nineteen years, so comparison of
their mortality rate with new residents is invalid. A number of
studies have documented increased mortality among newly admit-
ted patients to institutions;30 thus it is not surprising that the new
admissions would have a higher mortality rate. Comparison with
all chronic patients is suspect because, as the authors note, the
transfer patients as a group were physically healthier.31
The authors endeavor to explain the increased mortality found
in other studies by speculating that this effect was the result not of
the move itself but of other factors such as "poor physical health
and mental confusion."'32 They attribute the fact that the mortality
rate was slightly higher in the first thirty days of their own study to
a "weed[ing] out" of patients who "despite a lack of obvious physi-
cal stigmata barring their transfer, were poor relocation risks be-
cause of underlying physical illness, mental confusion, or
dependence upon a familiar institutional environment."33 Markson
and Cumming, however, overlook the obvious explanation that
transfer may be detrimental precisely because so many elderly pa-
tients possess these characteristics.
One particular study denying the mortality effect of transfer has
received a large measure of the attention focused on this issue. This
research was performed by Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan in Utah
between 1976 and 1978. The findings were published in a series of
articles in The Gerontologist.34 The authors studied two groups of
(which does not seem to be an appropriate population for valid comparison with institutional-
ized patients) had a death rate of 5.7%. Id. at page 318.
30. See Morton A. Lieberman, Relationship of Mortality Rates to Entrance to a Home
for the Aged, 16 GERIATRICS 515 (1961); Ben Z. Locke, Hospitalization History of Patients
with Mental Diseases of the Senium, 17 J. GERONTOLOGY 381 (1962); Elizabeth W. Markson,
The Geriatric House of Death. Hiding the Dying in a Mental Hospital, 1 AGING & HUM.
DEV. 37 (1970); Ivan N. Mensch, Studies of Older Psychiatric Patients, 3 GERONTOLOGIST
100 (1963); J.R. Whittier & D. Williams, The Coincidence and Constancy of Mortality Figures
for Aged Psychotic Patients Admitted to State Hospitals, 124 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIs-
EASE 618 (1956).
31. Markson & Cumming, supra note 28, at 318.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 319.
34. Jerry Borup et al., Relocation and its Effect on Mortality, 19 GERONTOLOGIST 135
(1979) [hereinafter Borup I]; Jerry Borup et al., Relocation: Its Effect on Health, Functioning
and Mortality, 20 GERONTOLOGIST 468 (1980) [hereinafter Borup II]; Jerry Borup & Daniel
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nursing home patients, an experimental group of 529 who were
transferred from homes that were closed because they could not
meet new state standards, and a control group of 453 living in
homes that met the standards and so were unaffected. In the first
published article on their findings, the authors compared mortality
rates for the two groups and reported that the transferred patients
had a significantly lower mortality rate (sixty-two or 11.2% of the
experimental patients died, compared with eighty or 17.7% from
the control group).35 The authors attributed this finding to age dif-
ferences between the relocated patients and the control group,
which included more patients over eighty (122 controls were over
eighty; ninety-seven experimental patients were over eighty), and
far fewer patients under sixty-five (fifty controls were under sixty-
five; 141 experimental subjects were under sixty-five).36 While these
age differences were obviously important, the authors did not con-
sider the possibility that transferring patients from substandard fa-
cilities to better ones might have a positive effect on their longevity.
In their second article, Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan examine
two patient characteristics that might be affected by transfer-
health (as reported by the patients themselves) and functioning (as
reported by nursing home staff)-and their relation to mortality.
For this aspect of the research, only those patients who were, in the
judgment of the staff, capable of being interviewed were included as
subjects. Clearly this criterion would eliminate from comparison
those patients with the lowest levels of functioning.
The authors observed no differences in self-reported health sta-
tus between the experimental and control groups. They note, how-
ever, that ninety-nine percent of the transferred patients indicated
that the care they were receiving in their new home was equal to or
better than the care at the previous facility. Similarly, transferred
patients were found to be less likely to have an unrealistically nega-
tive view of their health (hypochondria) after the move. The hypo-
chondria level of patients who did not move (and consequently did
not experience an improvement in care) tended to increase over
time. The authors also note that relocated patients may have had
less time to reflect on their health status as a result of preparatory
and adjustment activities.37
T. Gallego, Mortality as Affected by Interinstitutional Relocation: Update and Assessment, 21
GERONTOLOGIST 8 (1981) [hereinafter Borup III].
35. Margin of error less than 5%. Borup I, supra note 34, at 136.
36. Id. at 136-37.
37. Borup II, supra note 34, at 473.
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The daily functioning level-the level of ability to walk, bathe,
dress, eat, use the toilet, read, write, etc.--of the relocated patients
remained stable before and after the move, while that of the control
group deteriorated. The authors attribute this effect solely to the
fact of relocation. However, it is likely that the improved facilities
and the preparatory and adjustment procedures implemented also
contributed to this phenomenon.
According to Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan, the health status
of the patients prior to relocation did not have a significant correla-
tion with mortality; however, the patients who died had signifi-
cantly lower levels of daily functioning. Therefore, the authors
recognize that "patients who have problems with daily functioning
in the nursing home will become more vulnerable to death when
relocation intervenes .... ,,a Nevertheless, the authors still catego-
rize their study as finding that relocation has no significant effect on
mortality. 9
The conclusions drawn by Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan from
the data they gathered are vulnerable to some serious criticisms. To
begin with, the authors telegraph a discernible bias in the introduc-
tions to their two studies. The authors offer the following state-
ments as "background":
A full range of long term institutional health care (skilled, inter-
mediate, and personal) has been historically available in Utah.
In providing this service within the confines of its limited finan-
cial resources, the health care industry had converted many facil-
ities "designed for purposes other than health care into nursing
homes. However, demanding regulations have regularly ap-
peared on the scene bringing with them increasing burdens to the
nursing home industry. These regulations required such modifi-
cations as sprinkler systems, proper exit widths, larger room
sizes, elimination of stairways and many other similar modifica-
tions. With the full implementation of the 1974 nursing home
regulations in 1977, the final death blow was dealt to many nurs-
ing homes.40
This discussion conveys the message that the imposition of mini-
mum standards of patient safety and comfort constituted an unrea-
sonable burden on nursing home operators, and indicates a greater
concern for the interests of the industry than for patient welfare.
Thus, it seems probable that the authors were not impartial in un-
38. Id. at 475.
39. Id. at 469.
40. Borup I, supra note 34, at 135 (this version does not contain the words "long term
institutional"); Borup II, supra note 34, at 468.
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dertaking their determination of whether relocation might be harm-
ful or fatal to patients.
In addition to the question of bias and the methodological
problems discussed above, there are other deficiencies in the Utah
nursing home studies. First, the authors convey a misimpression
about the general trend in previous relocation research. They state
that three quarters of the studies done on the subject have found no
significant increase in mortality as a result of relocation.41 This cat-
egorization of the data is overly simplistic and inaccurate. The au-
thors make no distinction between studies of voluntarily and
involuntarily transferred patients, despite evidence that voluntary
transfers are not as likely to cause increased mortality.42 Further-
more, they do not acknowledge the fact that at least one study as-
sumed that transfer could cause death and specifically endeavored
to counteract this effect.43 They include two studies that found in-
creased mortality for particular subgroups of subjects 44 in their list
of studies denying the mortality effect (as well as in the increased
mortality list). The authors of these studies, however, definitely did
not deny that there is a mortality effect.
Second, Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan are much too quick to
universalize their findings. 45 They barely acknowledge that the pos-
itive effects of relocation they observed may have been influenced by
the fact that all the transferees experienced an improvement in their
environment. They make no attempt to describe what efforts were
made to prepare the patients, although a later article4 6 indicates
that such efforts were made; nor do they acknowledge, as other re-
searchers have, that adequate preparation can reduce or eliminate
the mortality effect. Instead, they conclude, on the basis of their
findings, that "relocation does not increase the probability of mor-
41. Borup I, supra note 34, at 136, 139; Borup II, supra note 34, at 469, 475.
42. See Norman Bourestom & Sandra Tars, Alterations in Life Patterns Following Nurs-
ing Home Relocation, 14 GERONTOLOGIST 506 (1974); Frances Carp, Effects of Improved
Housing on the Lives of Older People, in MIDDLE AGE AND AGING, at 409 (Bernice L. Neu-
garten ed. 1968); M. Powell Lawton & Silvia Yaffe, Mortality, Morbidity, and Voluntary
Change of Residence by Older People, 18 J. Am. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 823 (1970); Renato Y.
Pablo, Intra-Institutional Relocation: Its Impact on Long-Term Care Patients, 17 GERONTOL-
oGisT 426 (1977); Schulz & Brenner, supra note 21.
43. Zweig & Czank, supra note 25.
44. Norman Bourestom & Leon Pastalan, Final Report, Forced Relocation: Settings,
Staff and Patient Effects, UNIV. OF MICH. (1975); Markus, Blenkner, Bloom & Downs, supra
note 22.
45. "Improper generalization is probably the major error in social science research."
REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 44 (1983).
46. See infra note 55.
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tality for patients in general and specific sub-groups in particu-
lar,' ' 4 7 that "personal health evaluations are not affected by
relocation," '4 and that "relocation has a positive effect on the fumc-
tioning level of patients."'49 Whereas most researchers couch their
conclusions carefully in terms of possible inferences to be drawn
from what they observed, and often call for corroborating research,
these authors purport to make---on the basis of their limited obser-
vations-definitive statements about how the world is. They make
the common scientific assumption that because their experiment did
not confirm the research hypothesis (that relocation increases mor-
tality), they have proved the null hypothesis (that there is no causal
relation whatsoever between relocation and mortality). This as-
sumption is plainly erroneous.
If a study results in failure to reject a null hypothesis, the re-
searcher has not really "proved" a null hypothesis, but has failed
to find support for the research hypothesis. It is not unusual to
find studies with negative outcomes where the researcher has
placed a great deal of stock in "acceptance" of null hypotheses.
Such interpretations, strictly speaking, are in error because the
logic of a research design incorporates the testing of some alter-
native (research hypothesis) against the status quo (null hypothe-
sis). Although failure to find support for the alternative does
leave one with the status quo, it does not rule out other possible
alternatives.50
In this case, it is possible that although transfer of the Utah patients
to better facilities did not result in increased mortality or other det-
rimental effects, nursing home patients who are relocated to inferior
facilities, or who are inadequately prepared, or especially old or sick
or poorly adjusted, may indeed suffer increased or hastened mortal-
ity because of relocation. For Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan to
suggest that because they did not observe the mortality effect it can-
not possibly exist is at best unscientific, and at worst irresponsible.
Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan were sharply criticized for their
cavalier characterization of the mortality effect of transfer as a
myth,5" and their suggestion that nursing home administrators and
staff need not expend any effort in attempting to prevent this
47. Borup I, supra note 34, at 138.
48. Borup II, supra note 34, at 472.
49. Id. at 474.
50. FREDERICK WILLIAMS, REASONING WITH STATISTICS: How TO READ QUANTITA-
TIVE RESEARCH 79 (4th ed. 1992).
51. Borup I, supra note 34, at 138-39.
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"mythical" effect.52 According to the critics, "the question no
longer is whether relocation has negative (or positive) effects, but
under what conditions and with what kinds of populations are those
negative or positive effects most likely to be observed."' 53 Norman
Bourestom and Leon Pastalan also criticize Borup, Gallego, and
Heffernan for failing to discuss the mental and physical health sta-
tus and attitudes of their experimental subjects.54
Perhaps as a reaction to criticism, Borup individually published
a third paper reporting findings from the Utah nursing home study
in 1981. 5' This article deals primarily with psychological aspects of
transfer, such as patient concerns, problems, and responses to
problems with the move.56 Borup reports that patients' attitudes
about the move generally improve after they have settled into their
new homes. 57 Understandably, those who are unwilling to move
are most upset initially, but the majority of these patients (74.1%)
develop a positive attitude eventually.5" Patient attitudes about a
transfer are also affected by the amount and source of information
available to them.59 Approximately one third of the transferees re-
ported problems with losses of personal belongings. Of these pa-
tients, about half remained distressed over their losses three to six
months after the move." Overall, more women than men exper-
ienced stresses and problems associated with relocation, and pa-
tients over eighty experienced stress for longer periods.61 Borup
concludes that nursing home administrators and staff should imple-
ment various procedures for reducing patient stress, increasing
available information--especially about the location of the new
home and the date of the move-and safeguarding patient posses-
sions during the move.62
Borup and Gallego repeat their assertion that the scientific evi-
52. Norman Bourestom & Leon Pastalan, The Effects of Relocation on the Elderly: A
Reply to Borup, J.H., Gallego, D.T., & Heffernan, P.G., 21 GERONTOLOGIST 4 (1981).
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 6-7.
55. Jerry H. Borup, Relocation: Attitudes, Information Network and Problems Encoun-
tered, 21 GERONTOLOGIST 501 (1981)[hereinafter Borup IV].
56. Because of this focus, only the interviewable experimental group was included.
57. Borup III, supra note 55, at 504.
58. Id. at 506 (tables showing that of those who originally preferred to stay, 22.2%
eventually became very happy about moving and 51.9% became somewhat happy about
moving).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 508-09.
61. Id. at 509.
62. Id. at 509-10.
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dence, their own as well as that of previous studies, does not sup-
port any link between relocation and increased mortality in a article
directly responding to Bourestom and Pastalan.6 They reject
Bourestom and Pastalan's contention that differences among the
previous studies make generalization (i.e., acceptance of the null hy-
pothesis) impossible. They claim that while differences in patient
characteristics constitute "intervening variables" that may cause
higher mortality rates for some transferred groups, "relocation in
and of itself does not 'cause' an increase in mortality." 64 This anal-
ysis misses the point. Everyone knows that moving, by itself, is
stressful but not fatal. It is equally obvious that old people are often
weak and sick, and that they are going to die sooner or later-quite
possibly sooner. The point is, precisely, that transfer, when accom-
panied by these "intervening variables," may hasten death if it is
not accomplished with solicitous concern for patient welfare.
Although Borup and Gallego are unlikely to abandon their "no
increased mortality" theory, in their 1981 article they stress that
transfer can have other traumatic effects that may be prevented or
ameliorated through proper procedures and programs.6" On this
point, at least, there appears to be universal agreement.
C. ANALYSES ATTEMPTING TO RECONCILE THE
CONFLICTING DATA
Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan were not the only scientists to
notice that the evidence on transfer effects was conflicting. Most
interested psychologists and gerontologists, however, took a differ-
ent approach to the problem. Rather than seeking to disprove the
existence of the mortality effect by dismissing the findings of the
scientists who had observed it, as Borup and his colleagues did,
other scientists attempted to formulate explanations that could ac-
commodate all of the data. In fact, other than the writings of
Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan, virtually all of the literature on
transfer trauma accepts the validity of the studies that reported in-
creased mortality, and goes on to ask why negative or positive ef-
fects of relocation occur when they do.
Schulz and Brenner begin with a theoretical framework bor-
63. Jerry H. Borup & Daniel T. Gallego, Mortality as Affected by Institutional Reloca-
tion: Update and Assessment, 21 The Gerontologist 8 (1981) (the two articles appearing side
by side in the "Forum" section of this journal).
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 14 (advocating preparation in order to reduce the stress of relocation).
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rowed from social psychology." According to this model, reloca-
tion is a major life change that naturally produces stress; however,
the degree of stress experienced is a function of the perceived pre-
dictability and controllability of the stressful event.67 Schulz and
Brenner attempt to analyze the existing data on relocation of the
elderly in light of the predictability-control model. They hypothe-
size that according to the model, voluntary moves should have
fewer negative effects than involuntary moves (the control factor),
and transfers involving a lesser degree of change and a greater de-
gree of preparation should have fewer negative effects (the predict-
ability factor).
The authors acknowledge that other variables, such as an im-
provement in environmental quality as a result of the move, will
also affect patient outcomes.6" They also recognize that their work
has certain limitations based on its nature as an informal post hoc
analysis of data gathered by others, and that some of the data ana-
lyzed exhibit methodological shortcomings.69 Nevertheless, Schulz
and Brenner confidently conclude, based on their examinations of
previous studies, that the subjects' level of control over the move
and the new environment, and the predictability of the move-as
measured by the similarity of the new surroundings to the old and
the amount and quality of preparation-were in fact predictors of
patient outcomes.7" Schulz and Brenner also note that in at least
one study, "patients who improved went to environments which en-
couraged residents to be independent, make their own decisions
about the use of time and space, try out new skills, and develop new
relationships and activities inside and outside of the facility. Pa-
tients denied these favorable conditions exhibited withdrawal and
deterioration."71 The authors recommend controlled experiments
to confirm their findings, and to discover ways in which the lives of
the institutionalized elderly may be enhanced by increasing their
sense of control.7 2
A 1980 article by Anson Levitan (one of the few that takes a
broad view of the transfer issue) reviews the transfer trauma litera-
ture and concludes that the weight of evidence confirms the exist-
66. Schulz & Brenner, supra note 21.
67. Id. at 323-24.
68. Id. at 325.
69. Id. at 326.
70. Id. at 331-32.
71. Id. at 327-28.
72. Id. at 330-31.
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ence of the transfer trauma phenomenon, including the mortality
effect.73 According to Levitan, "the literature shows the following
factors to be associated with a high risk of transfer trauma: (1) in-
voluntary relocation involving a significant change in environment,
(2) disorientation, (3) passivity, (4) withdrawal, (5) 'field depen-
dence'74 or impaired cognitive functions, (6) neurosis or depression,
and (7) psychosis. ' 75  Studies denying the existence of transfer
trauma or its effect on mortality have, in Levitan's view, failed to
take these factors into account. For example, Markson and Cum-
ming's study76 excluded residents with high risk traits, such as dis-
oriented patients or those with poor medical prognoses; Borup,
Gallego, and Heffernan did not analyze the nature or degree of en-
vironmental change its subjects experienced, nor any of the other
risk factors enumerated above.77 Levitan also notes a distinction-
largely ignored by researchers-between mass transfers in which
staff and residents remain together and those in which the residents
are dispersed (for example, when a home is decertified). Clearly the
degree of disruption and stress is lower when patients are not sepa-
rated from their familiar caretakers and friends.
Levitan suggests that those who argue against the existence of
transfer trauma generally do so because they believe that institu-
tionalization is detrimental to the elderly-resulting in "depen-
dence, apathy and withdrawal"---and therefore is to be avoided or
terminated whenever possible. By contrast, Levitan argues that
"the importance of noninstitutional care is not undermined by rec-
ognition of transfer trauma. ' 79 For some patients, including those
with high risk characteristics, institutionalization is generally both
appropriate and beneficial, and it is deinstitutionalization (or other
inappropriate transfer) that threatens these patients with harm."0
Thus, Levitan concludes that the most vulnerable individuals
should not be moved unless absolutely necessary, while other pa-
tients should be relocated to whatever setting is most conducive to
their welfare, with proper planning and counseling in all cases.
73. Anson B. Levitan, Nursing Home Dilemma? Transfer Trauma and the Noninstitu-
tional Option: A Review of the Literature, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 653 (1980).
74. Id. at 655 (defining "field dependent" individuals as "being highly influenced by
their environment and as having limited cognitive abilities").
75. Id.
76. Supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
77. Levitan, supra note 73, at 656.
78. Id. at 657.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 658.
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Levitan also recommends that alternatives to entering a nursing
home be available for those elderly individuals who are capable of
living independently.81
In 1981, The Gerontologist devoted a substantial portion of one
issue to a symposium on transfer trauma. In her introduction to
this group of articles, Nancy Eustis cautions that in social policy
contexts such as this one, "it is potentially harmful to ignore the
evidence of negative effects, although not demonstrated in all or
even most studies." 2 In the lengthiest symposium piece, Thomas
Coffman catalogues the wide diversity of methodology and statisti-
cal analysis techniques used in transfer trauma research.
Some studies have used control groups while others have used
baseline (pre-move) data for comparisons, with many variations
on each design. Some investigators have performed no statistical
tests on their data. Others have used conventional tests of signifi-
cance, but not always the same or equivalent tests, nor always in
the accepted manner. Still others have invented unique signifi-
cance tests of their own. Chi-square tests have sometimes been
performed on multi-cell tables so constructed that estimates of
significance do not clearly address a single issue such as survival
versus non-survival. The time periods examined sometimes span
pre-move and post-move periods and the post-move time spans
range from a few weeks to 12 months (even though many author-
ities believe that effects will be most evident in the first 3 to 6
months afterwards). Deaths have been counted and mortality
rates computed on various assortments of actual or intended
movers and non-movers, baseline estimates, "at-risk" popula-
tions, etc.
83
Because this confusion makes cross-study comparisons exceedingly
difficult, Coffman undertakes a "z-score" 84 analysis of the multitude
of statistical data. Using a rather lenient two-tailed (appropriate
because both increases and decreases in mortality have been ob-
served) probability of .10 as the confidence level, Coffman states
that twelve of the twenty-six studies analyzed did not report statisti-
cally significant differences in mortality correlated with relocation.
Eight of the remaining studies showed significant decreases and six
showed increases. Coffman maintains that neither the increased
mortality observations nor the decreased mortality (survival) find-
81. Id. at 659.
82. Nancy N. Eustis, Symposium Relocation-Interpretation and Application, 21 GER-
ONTOLOGIST 481, 482 (1981).
83. Thomas L. Coffman, Relocation and Survival of Institutionalized Aged: A Re-exami-
nation of the Evidence, 21 GERONTOLOGIST 483, 485 (1981).
84. Defined as "standard normal deviates ... for differences between proportional mor-
tality rates." Id. at 495 (Appendix A).
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ings can be dismissed on the basis of experimental deficiencies, since
methodological problems were, in his opinion, about evenly distrib-
uted among the studies.85
Coffman concludes, in light of further, meta-analysis of the data,
that the most lethal moves are those that involve closure of an insti-
tution or dispersal of its residents; such moves result in what
Coffman terms "disintegrative processes"-that is, "serious deterio-
ration in the support system" on which vulnerable elderly residents
depend. 6 If sufficient replacement support is not immediately pro-
vided, the negative effects can be catastrophic. Coffman also notes a
related high correlation between staff morale and patient out-
comes.11 Coffman's conclusions seem consistent with those of
Schulz and Brenner, in that both approaches view the quality of the
patient's interaction with the overall environment as crucial.
Coffman closes with two notes of caution. First, even if the oc-
currence of the mortality effect is rare, policymakers should not
minimize the other negative effects that relocation may cause. Sec-
ond, extrapolation from experimental data may be inaccurate be-
cause most research is conducted at "better" institutions; problems
of all kinds may be more prevalent and more serious in lesser facili-
ties."8 In making decisions about transfers, the general welfare and
survival of elderly residents must be of paramount importance.
Claire Kowalski's symposium article reviews successful efforts
to make relocation a positive experience.8 9 She echoes Levitan's
recommendation that patients should be evaluated to determine the
least restrictive placement alternative that will meet their needs.'
For patients who require an institutional home, the crucial sense of
control that Schulz and Brenner assert can be fostered. According
to Kowalski, "frail elderly [patients] may still perceive the locus of
control as being in themselves if they have voluntarily entrusted
their care to others whom they trust, and if these others behave so
as to merit that trust."91
85. Id. at 491.
86. Id. at 492.
87. Id. at 493.
88. Id. at 494.
89. N. Claire Kowalski, Institutional Relocation: Current Programs and Applied Ap-
proaches, 21 GEROarOLOIST 512 (1981).
90. Id. at 517 (stating that a patient's health and social functioning should be assessed
with a view toward the most appropriate type of residence).
91. Id.
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III. LEGAL USES OF TRANSFER TRAUMA DATA
As may be gathered from the scientific literature, both concern
for the elderly and the interests of nursing home operators have
generated attention to the transfer trauma phenomenon. In litiga-
tion, nursing home owners have raised the specter of transfer
trauma in efforts to prevent decertification of their facilities or ces-
sation of Medicare or Medicaid payments.92 Alternatively, patients
have attempted to stop or forestall unwanted transfers by arguing
that they will be harmed by relocation.93 Judicial sympathy for
transfer trauma arguments has varied.94 In addition, as the transfer
trauma phenomenon became widely documented and discussed in
scientific literature and in case law, it attracted the interest of legis-
lators, who have used it as the rationale for assorted nursing home
regulations.
A. CAsEs
1. Cases Preceding O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center
Two cases from the mid-1970s, while not employing the specific
term "transfer trauma," do reflect concern for possible harm to
relocated patients. In the 1974 case Burchette v. Dumpson," pa-
tients sued the commissioner of the New York City Department of
Social Services, seeking injunctive relief to prevent their impending
transfer to nursing homes providing a lower level of care.96 In de-
nying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
stated that "[t]he damage which may result from such transfers is
irreparable in the true sense of the word. Changes in surroundings
and movement of long distances of senior citizens who are suffering
from physical and psychological infirmities are likely to aggravate
their condition and increase the likelihood of death."97
The Seventh Circuit articulated a similar principle in Hathaway
v. Mathews,98 a 1976 case brought by a nursing home owner to chal-
lenge the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) ter-
mination of Medicaid benefits to patients residing in the home.
According to the court, "to compel the residents of the Home to
move to a new facility (or a number of new facilities) would create a
92. See infra.
93. See infra.
94. See infra.
95. 387 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. N.Y. 1974).
96. Id at 814.
97. Id. at 819.
98. 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976).
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major disruption in their lives. Where the deprivation to the indi-
viduals affected by the removal of a governmental benefit is this se-
vere, the Government's asserted interest must be pressing to justify
postponing the hearing until after termination."99
The first case to use the phrase "transfer trauma" was Klein v.
Mathews1" in 1977. Citing Burchette and Hathaway,"'1 the court
held that nursing home residents had a property interest in contin-
ued occupancy of, and continued payments to, the nursing home
where they were living, and a corresponding due process right to a
hearing prior to termination by HEW of the home as a Medicaid
provider. The court noted that HEW itself had acknowledged the
harm caused to transferred nursing home residents in an internal
memorandum that stated, "'There is a genuine hazard in the relo-
cation of infirm aging persons from one facility to another. Dra-
matic increases in mortality far in excess of what would normally be
expected have been documented.' "102 However, the court stressed
that the possibility of increased mortality was not an indispensable
element in its decision. "It is sufficient to say that transfer works
grievous loss. Aside from the physical danger, transfer trauma
presents serious psychological danger.""0 3 The court held that pa-
tients forced to suffer such harm were in effect experiencing an im-
permissible reduction in their benefits. 0°
Klein v. Mathews was affirmed by the Third Circuit under the
name Klein v. Califano.10 5 However, the appeals court based its
decision on the fact that residents had a property interest in contin-
uing occupancy derived from federal statutes and regulations
prohibiting transfers except under specified circumstances. Trans-
fer trauma was relegated to a footnote.
[WMe deem it unnecessary to address an alternative argument for
invoking the due process clause in this case, that transfer trauma
suffered by dislocated nursing home patients reduces the finan-
cial benefits to which the patients are entitled under the Medicaid
program. We believe that the Medicaid program guarantees an
already institutionalized patient a property interest in continued
occupancy, an interest distinct from the interest in continued eli-
gibility for benefits. Dislocation may cause transfer trauma, but
99. Id. at 231.
100. 430 F. Supp. 1005 (). N.J. 1977).
101. Id. at 1009.
102. Id. (quoting DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MEMORANDUM 2 (February 19, 1975)).
103. 430 F.Supp. 1005, 1010 (1977).
104. Id.
105. 586 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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the denial of the patient's property interest in continued occu-
pancy is unaffected by the extent of the loss or harm associated
with this denial.... We do not decide whether transfer trauma
constitutes a deprivation of recipient's property interest in a
given level of cash benefits.106
Although the court did not foreclose future use of this argument, it
clearly did not accord transfer trauma as much weight as the dis-
trict court.
Two other 1978 district court decisions gave little credence to
the transfer trauma argument. The court in Cornell v. Creasy stated
that "tihe scientific experts are in disagreement, and the statistical
facts show no consistent trend toward higher mortality in trans-
ferred Medicaid patients solely on account of uncounselled trans-
fers."10' 7 In Schwartzberg v. Califano,10° the court deferred to the
judgment of HEW. "Since HEW is aware of the phenomenon of
'transfer trauma,' it undoubtedly believes that the danger to health
and safety imposed upon patients remaining at Kings Care out-
weighs the possible trauma attendant upon leaving it." °9
A few months prior to the Court of Appeals decision in Klein v.
Califano, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia decided Bracco v. Lackner. 1° The plaintiffs were forty-four
elderly residents of a nursing home in San Francisco that was
threatened with a termination of government benefits. The city suf-
fered from a shortage of nursing home beds for patients who re-
quired government financial assistance, and the residents feared
they would have nowhere to go.
The court found that the residents were not being given suffi-
cient notice and preparation for the relocation. It based this conclu-
sion on its analysis of transfer trauma literature and testimony,
including (among others) Aldrich and Mendkoff's study finding in-
creased mortality, and testimony by Dr. Leon Pastalan regarding
the type of preparation necessary to prevent or ameliorate negative
consequences of transfer. 1 '
The court also noted that few of the deficiencies enumerated by
the city as grounds for closing the facility had anything to do with
the safety of the structure itself; on the other hand, there was sub-
stantial evidence that problems with patient care, while previously
106. Id. at 259, n.16.
107. 491 F. Supp. 124, 126 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
108. 453 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
109. Id. at 1047.
110. 462 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
111. Id. at 444-46.
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quite serious, had for the most part been corrected. Thus, the court
believed the situation presented no emergency. 1 2 The potential
danger to the patients from a hasty move was far greater in the
opinion of the court 1 13
Furthermore, according to the court "so long as the state has
acted to give the Center residents a legitimate expectation of contin-
ued residency [by certifying the facility], it cannot deprive them of
that expectation except in accordance with applicable federal stan-
dards."1" 4 The applicable federal regulations provided that recipi-
ents' benefits could not be reduced without opportunity for a
hearing,11 5 and the court considered involuntary transfer-with its
attendant danger of transfer trauma as well as loss of associations-
to constitute a reduction in benefits.' 1 6
Several other cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center also acknowledged the
existence and relevance of transfer trauma. In Brede v. Department
of Health, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[t]here
has been considerable judicial and scientific recognition of the phe-
nomenon known as 'transfer trauma'," citing Bracco v. Lackner,
Klein v. Mathews, and Burchette v. Dumpson.II7 The court in Brede
had been asked to decide whether elderly patients remaining at a
leprosarium that the state of Hawaii wanted to close had a right to a
hearing. The circuit court remanded for a factual determination as
to "[tihe degree to which this phenomenon is applicable to the lep-
rosy patients presently resisting transfer" from the home to a hospi-
tal in Honolulu, since in the court's view, this would be relevant to
the issue of what process was due. "To the extent.., that transfer
trauma is a possible result of the state's decision to relocate the Hale
Mohalu patients, relocation may constitute a deprivation cognizable
under the due process clause."118
Two state cases also expressed concern about transfer trauma.
In the Colorado Court of Appeals case MacLeod v. Miller,1 9 the
court reversed a lower court denial of injunctive relief requested by
112. Id. at 455 ("The Department's cries of emergency ring hollow in light of the desire
of those actually facing the alleged emergency to remain in the Center.").
113. Id. at 445-47, 453 (citing Hathaway v. Mathews, Klein v,. Mathews, and Burchette v.
Dumpson as examples of prior judicial recognition of transfer trauma).
114. Id. at 449.
115. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1992).
116. 462 F.Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
117. 616 F.2d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1980).
118. Id.
119. 612 P.2d 1158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
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the plaintiff, a nursing home patient suffering from multiple sclero-
sis. The nursing home planned to transfer the plaintiff, a Medicaid
recipient, to a home in another town for nonmedical reasons. The
court found that "expert testimony at the hearing established that
plaintiff would suffer 'transfer trauma' if moved away from his sup-
port group .... This trauma could present both psychological and
physical side effects and worsen his condition." 120 Because this in-
jury would not be compensable by adequate damages, the court re-
garded an injunction as an appropriate remedy.
Finally, in Health Care Administration Board v. Finley,12 1 the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the right of the state Health
Care Administration to issue a regulation requiring nursing homes
to provide beds to indigent patients. According to the court, in the
absence of this regulation, indigent patients could be summarily
transferred to their detriment if their benefits expired. Because the
regulation was a reasonable means of preventing transfer trauma, it
represented a legitimate exercise of the state's police power.122
2. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center
The trend toward judicial sympathy for patients who might suf-
fer transfer trauma was interrupted by the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center.'23 When
HEW notified the nursing home that it was being decertified, both
the home and a group of patients filed suit to block HEW's action.
A district court issued a preliminary injunction, but when HEW
denied Town Court's petition for reconsideration, the court dis-
solved the injunction. The home and the patients both appealed.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case on the same
day as Klein v. Califano.124 The appeals court denied further relief
to the home, but held that the patients were entitled to a hearing
prior to termination of their benefits.125 Helen O'Bannon, Secretary
of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (the agency re-
sponsible for administering the state Medicaid program), petitioned
for certiorari.
The respondents, as well as several amici curiae 126, filed briefs in
120. Id. at 316.
121. 415 A.2d 1147 (N.J. 1980).
122. Id. at 1153.
123. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
124. Klein v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir. 1978), was decided first, and it was fol-
lowed in Town Court Nursing Center v. Beal, 586 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1978).
125. See, Klein v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250, 258 (3rd Cir. 1978).
126. Amici included (1) Jill Harris and the Residents of Edgefield Manor, (2) The Na-
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which they provided the court with copious information about the
potentially devastating effects of transfer trauma. However, the ma-
jority responded to this information with a lack of interest border-
ing on disdain. Ignoring the impassioned arguments of the
respondents and the amici, the opinion simply acknowledges the ev-
idence and blandly states, in a footnote, that the justices will "as-
sume for the purposes of this decision that there is a risk that some
residents may encounter severe emotional and physical hardship as
a result of a transfer." '127 The Court goes on to characterize the
impact of relocation on residents as "an indirect and incidental re-
sult of the Government's enforcement action, [that] does not
amount to a deprivation of any interest in life, liberty, or prop-
erty." 2 According to the Court, the due process right is not trig-
gered by "indirect adverse effects of governmental action." '129
Furthermore, the government's actions are intended to benefit the
patients. Finally, in the Court's view, the home has a strong eco-
nomic incentive to challenge the decertification, and so will ade-
quately represent the interests of the patients.
1 30
There are several flaws in the Court's reasoning. First, it is not
at all clear that transfer and its attendant risks are an indirect result
of the government's decision in any coherent sense. As noted by
The Legal Aid Society of New York, et al. in their amicus brief, and
acknowledged by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence, transfer is
"a necessary, not an incidental, consequence of decertification;"'131
"a basic purpose of decertification is to force patients to relo-
cate."' 32 Thus, the relocation and its effects are truly direct prod-
ucts of the government's action.
Second, in declaring the government's decertification decision to
be for the patients' benefit, the Court makes two unsupported-and
unstated-assumptions: (1) that the home is (as the government as-
serts) providing substandard care and therefore is an unqualified fa-
cility; and (2) that the harm from residing in such a facility exceeds
tional Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform; and (3) The Legal Aid Society of New
York, Legal Services for the Elderly Poor, Coalition of Institutionalized Aged and Disabled,
Inc., and Friends and Relatives of Institutionalized Aged, Inc.
127. 447 U.S. at 784 n.16.
128. Id. at 787.
129. Id. at 789.
130. Id. at 789 n. 22.
131. Brief for Amicus Curiae, The Legal Aid Society of New York City, Legal Services
for the Elderly Poor, Coalition of Institutionalized Aged and Disabled, Inc. at 39, O'Bannon
(No. 78-1318).
132. 447 U.S. at 793 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the harm that would result from transfer. Justice Brennan observes
in his dissent that "[i]t is no answer to say that respondents' only
right is to stay in a qualified home,... because whether the home is
qualified is precisely the issue to be determined." 133 The patients
were seeking a right to be heard on this very question. The Court
denied them that right by taking the government's word on the sub-
ject as gospel. 134 Because the Court refuses to recognize that the
home's status is a legitimate subject of controversy, the Court is
blind to the valuable contribution that patients could make to a res-
olution. Furthermore, because the majority gives such short shrift
to the transfer trauma argument, the Court fails to see that the
"cure" of transfer may be much worse that the "disease" of sub-
standard care-depending, of course, on how serious the facility's
deficiencies are, which is exactly the question that needs to be
answered.
Finally, the Court assumes that the nursing home can ade-
quately represent the rights of the patients. Both Justice Brennan
and the amici disagree with this view. Justice Brennan states that
"the patients have some interests which are separate from the inter-
ests of the provider, and they could contribute some information
relevant to the decertification decision if they were given an oppor-
tunity. '1 35 Amici Jill Harris et al. argue that while the facility can
try to defend itself regarding the sufficiency of cleanliness, staffing,
maintenance, recordkeeping, etc., only the patients can provide vital
information about their social ties, and the effect that transfer will
have on their lives. "It cannot be assumed that doctors or other
medical personnel involved in a survey team are familiar with trans-
fer trauma or with the patient conditions which correlate with high
risk in a move."136 If the patients are not given a voice, important
information will be omitted from consideration.
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun chastises the majority for
failing to give the transfer trauma issue sufficient weight.
Although the Court assumes that "transfer trauma" exists. ... it
goes on to reject this argument. By focusing solely on the "indi-
rectness" of resulting physical and psychological trauma, the
Court implies that regardless of the degree of the demonstrated
risk that widespread illness or even death attends decertification-
133. Id. at 806. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. See Susan Rosenfeld, Comment, O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center: Patients'
Right to Participate in Nursing Home Decertification, 7 AM J.L. & MED. 469, 477 (1981-82).
135. 447 U.S. at 806 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Brief for Amicus Curiae Jill Harris and the Residents of Edgefield Manor at 76-77,
O'Bannon (No. 78-1318).
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induced transfers, it is of no moment. I cannot join such a heart-
less holding.
137
Surprisingly, Justice Blackmun then proceeds to undertake his own
incredibly perfunctory analysis of the transfer trauma literature.
Apparently relying entirely on Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan's
declaration that transfer trauma is a myth, Blackmun states that
"many informed researchers have concluded at least that this dan-
ger is unproved," and opines that "[r]ecognition of a constitutional
right plainly cannot rest on such an inconclusive body of research
and opinion."13 Although Blackmun also cites two other studies
that did assert the existence of transfer trauma, he only gives
credence to Borup, et al. This is hardly the balanced evaluation of
the data one would have anticipated based on Blackmun's compas-
sionate preamble. As George Annas has observed,
[lIt seems somewhat extreme to base a judicial decision primarily
on one article that is not even cited or discussed by the other
justices. The article may well be authoritative, but its mere ap-
pearance in The Gerontologist does not make it so. Indeed,
Blackmun also cites two other articles from this journal that
came to a different conclusion.
139
Thus, the transfer trauma phenomenon was never given adequate
attention by the Supreme Court.
3. Subsequent Cases
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in O'Bannon appeared to leave
the door ajar for the introduction of better evidence establishing the
existence of transfer trauma."4 The majority had also indicated
that there might be a distinction between groups of residents who
were relocated in mass transfers as a result of decertification or clo-
sure decisions by the government (an "indirect" effect), and individ-
ual patients who were forced to move as a result of government
determinations (presumably a "direct" effect). 141
137. 447 U.S. at 802-03 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 804.
139. George J. Annas, Transfer Trauma and the Right to a Hearing, 10 HASTINGS CTR.
RrT. 23, 24(1980); see also James A. Thorson, Relocation of the Elderly: Some Implications
from the Research, 1 GERONTOLOGY REv. 28 (1988) (Blackmun relied on Borup's study,
which excluded the most vulnerable patients, and Blackmun apparently misinterpreted the
cited study by Bouresom and Tars).
140. See eg., Maryanne Newman-Hafner, Note, O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing
Center, Inc: Limiting the Due Process Rights of Nursing Home Residents, 24 ST. Louis L.J.
828, 851 (1981). ("While there is presently much debate about the existence of transfer
trauma, perhaps the Supreme Court will reevaluate its position on this claim if the medical
community can conclusively establish the existence of this phenomenon.")
141. O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 785-87.
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In Yaretsky v. Blum,142 the plaintiffs persuaded the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that O'Bannon was distinguishable from their
situation, and that the O'Bannon decision had not "foreclose[d] the
question [of] whether there is a liberty interest in the avoidance of
transfer trauma .... 143
"[I]ecertification... is not the same for purposes of due process
analysis as a decision to transfer a particular patient . .. ."
Moreover, O'Bannon was not decided on the basis of a record
that included much detailed information about the existence of
transfer trauma .... We note that the record in this case con-
tains ample evidence that transfer of elderly patients, even when
it does not pose an increased risk of mortality, carries with it the
undeniable possibility of emotional and psychological harm-at
least in the case of many individuals. To us this does not seem
any less a "liberty interest" than a prison inmate's interest in not
being transferred from a penitentiary to a psychiatric hospital;
which interest was accorded constitutional protection in Vitek v.Jones .... 144
However, in reaching its decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the court
of appeals had to find that the transfer decisions were state action.
This aspect of the decision proved fatal to the plaintiffs' case when it
was appealed to the Supreme Court as Blum v. Yaretsky.1 45  In
Blum the Supreme Court held that, although the transfer decisions
were necessitated by the Medicaid payment scheme, the actual de-
termination that a patient required a different level care than he or
she was receiving was made by a private doctor, and so there was no
state action. The additional evidence on transfer trauma in the rec-
ord was to no avail, because the Court never reached that element
of the case.
Since Yaretsky v. Blum, most courts presented with transfer
trauma arguments have adopted the rationale of O'Bannon either
expressly or implicitly."6 However, there is evidence of a gradual
142. 629 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
817 (1981), and rev'd, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
143. Id. at 821.
144. Id.
145. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
146. See Stewart v. Bernstein, 769 F.2d 1088, 1093 n.7 (5th Cir. 1985); Hanke v. Walters,
740 F.2d 654, 655 (8th Cir. 1984) (dismissing the transfer trauma argument as uncertain and
deciding on other grounds); Punikaia v. Clark, 720 F.2d 564, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984) (appeal of Hale Mohalu leprosarium case discussed supra notes
114-116 and accompanying text); Bumpus v. Clark, 681 F.2d 679, 683-86 (9th Cir. 1982);
Hillhaven West, Inc. v. Bowen, 669 F. Supp. 312, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1987); Gruter Foundation,
Inc. v. Bowen, 652 F. Supp. 245, 254 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Roberson v. Wood, 500 F. Supp.
854, 860 (S.D. Ill. 1980); Bell v. Thornburgh, 420 A.2d 443, 448-50 (Pa. 1980); Williams v.
Commonwealth of Pa., 427 A.2d 319, 320-21 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
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change in the last few years, reflecting recognition of transfer
trauma by numerous state legislatures. In 1986 the Court of Ap-
peals of Michigan found that a Medicaid patient with muscular dys-
trophy could be transferred from a hospital to a nursing home,
despite his claim that he would suffer transfer trauma as a result.
Nevertheless, the court did not discount the existence of the phe-
nomenon; it merely decided that "the evidence did not show a suffi-
cient likelihood that petitioner would suffer 'transfer trauma.' "147
Subsequently, several cases have specifically acknowledged the
existence of transfer trauma and the efforts by legislators to deal
with the problem. For example, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri based its decision in Lexington Man-
agement Company, Inc. v. Department of Social Services 148 in part
on the legislative history of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1980. In explaining its decision to enjoin the federal and state
defendants from withholding Skilled Nursing Facility ("SNF")-
level Medicaid funding for the plaintiff's facility pending exhaustion
of the plaintiff's administrative remedies, the court stated, "Con-
gress... recognized that alternatives to immediate decertification
were desirable to minimize 'the need for traumatic transfers of large
numbers of patients during the time needed improvements are being
made in the facility."' 149 The court was persuaded that, in the case
before it, the residents would suffer transfer trauma if the home
were closed as a result of the threatened reduction in funding.150
Therefore, the government's decision to terminate SNF-level Medi-
caid funding rather than seek some less drastic alternative "fl[ew] in
the face of congressional intent, and therefore, constitute[d] a gross
and impermissible abuse of discretion." '
The very same legislative history was invoked by an Ohio dis-
trict court in Wayside Farms v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Ser1ices5s2 According to the Wayside I court, Congress
recognized that "there is a nationwide shortage of skilled nursing
home beds and that there is a validity in forestalling the need for
traumatic transfers of large numbers of patients pending correction
of deficiencies which do not pose an immediate threat of harm to
147. Reed v. Hurley Medical Ctr., 395 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
148. 656 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
149. Id. at 44 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1980
U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526, 5570).
150. 656 F. Supp. at 41.
151. Id. at 45.
152. 663 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ohio 1987) [hereinafter Wayside 1].
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them." 15 3 The plaintiff had offered evidence that transfer would be
difficult or impossible for many of its residents, 154 and the court
therefore enjoined the government from terminating Wayside's pro-
vider agreement or its Medicaid funding until its administrative
remedies were exhausted.155
However, when the case returned to the Ohio district court a
year later, a different judge gave minimal weight to the plaintiff's
transfer trauma argument. In Wayside Farm, Inc. v. Bowen,15 6 the
decision to terminate Wayside's provider agreement had been up-
held by the Appeals Council. The facility was appealing that rul-
ing, and was again seeking an injunction to maintain its Medicaid
funding pending its latest appeal. The district court held that in-
junctive relief was inappropriate because the plaintiff had shown lit-
tle likelihood of success on the merits.157 (The facility's challenges
to the Appeals Council's decision were primarily procedural, and
the court found them unpersuasive.)15 s The court purported to give
equal consideration to the question whether granting or denying the
injunction would cause substantial harm to others, and acknowl-
edged that "some of the residents may suffer severely from a move
should the funds be terminated." '59 Nevertheless, the court in ef-
fect declared the harm to be irrelevant because of the likelihood that
the facility would lose eventually.
Notwithstanding the evidence that many of the residents of Way-
side may suffer from what has been referred to as "transfer
trauma," the Court is of the view that it would be just as harmful
for the residents to prolong an inevitable move given the low
showing of likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiff's
case.
160
This holding essentially nullifies the "substantial harm" prong of
the injunctive relief analysis, but beyond that, it reveals a deficient
understanding of transfer trauma. A delay in transferring the resi-
dents-even if such a move were demonstrably inevitable-would
certainly not be equally harmful; on the contrary, it would allow
more time for adequate preparation and provision of support serv-
ices. The Wayside II court's failure to grasp the nature and signifi-
153. Id. at 952.
154. Id. at 954.
155. Id. at 955.
156. 698 F. Supp. 1356 (N.D. Ohio 1988) [hereinafter Wayside Ill.
157. Id. at 1364.
158. Id. at 1362-64.
159. Id. at 1365.
160. Id.
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cance of transfer trauma is further illustrated by the court's
quotation from Gruter Foundation, Inc. v. Bowen.161 According to
the Gruter court, "if the present surroundings are found injurious to
the residents' health and safety, the trauma caused by remaining
there is of greater concern to this ourt .... ,162 Apparently both
the Gruter and Wayside II courts fell into the same error as the
Supreme Court in O'Bannon,1 63 by assuming that the government's
disputed determination about the state of a facility must be correct,
and that the harm from the facility's deficiencies must be greater
than the potential harm from transfer. In at least some cases, either
or both of these assumptions will be wrong. Residents may suffer
harm or even death as a result of jurists' lack of understanding.
Neither the Gruter nor the Wayside II court mentioned the Con-
gressional concern over transfers that was articulated in the legisla-
tive history of the Medicaid statutes, and upon which the Wayside I
court relied. It is also interesting to note that Ohio (where these
three cases were decided) is not a state that currently acknowledges
transfer trauma in its state laws.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Villines v. Division of Aging 1"
stated that "(t]he severity of the complications from 'transfer
trauma' ranges from mild depression to severe illness and death,"' 165
and in deciding to overturn the state's decision to revoke the plain-
tiff's nursing home license, the court considered the intent of the
state legislature in adopting nursing home regulations.
The legislature no doubt saw the availability of remedies less
drastic than the shutdown of a deficient home as being in the best
interest of nursing home residents for many of whom forced
transfers occasioned by revocation would be dispiriting and even
life-threatening. 166
The court concluded that revocation should be a last resort, to be
implemented only when all efforts to secure compliance had failed.
A California Court of Appeal similarly invoked the intentions of
161. 652 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
162. Gruter, 652 F. Supp. at 254, quoted in Wayside II, 698 F. Supp. at 1366. Even more
disturbing, the court in Gruter went on to state that "although any trauma incumbent in
transferring Gruter residents is of great concern to this court, their health and safety is of far
greater concern," as if transfer trauma were totally unrelated to the residents' health. 652 F.
Supp. at 254.
163. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
164. 722 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
165. Id. at 946.
166. Id. at 945 (quoting Stiffelman v. Abrams, 655 S.W.2d 522, 530 (Mo. 1983) (en
banc)).
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the legislature in Newland v. Kizer. 67 Plaintiffs who were facing
transfer had filed suit to require the state Department of Health
Services to promulgate regulations governing operation of nursing
homes by receivers. The court found that the department was re-
quired to do so, because "the Legislature intended to provide an
alternative to avoid the transfer trauma accompanying the abrupt
involuntary transfer of frail elderly patients from one nursing home
to another."' 16
8
Finally, in Good Shepherd Health Facilities of Colorado v. Dept.
of Health,169 another receivership case, the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals declared that "[the statute] expressly provides that the statu-
tory purpose is to safeguard against 'potential transfer trauma'
resulting from relocation of patients, when, as here, a long-term
health care facility is closed because of violation of applicable laws
and regulations."' 170 On this basis the court decided that the state
could not withhold funds from the receiver. Thus, legislative recog-
nition of transfer trauma has clearly influenced the courts in the
years since O'Bannon.
B. LEGISLATION
1. Federal
Evidence of congressional interest in and concern over transfer
trauma dates from as early as 1974. In that year, testimony by re-
searchers Lieberman and Pastalan was read into the Congressional
record along with a statement by Illinois senator Charles Percy, in
which he cautioned that aspects of federal Medicaid legislation
could force relocation of as many as ten thousand elderly patients,
and thereby result in severe harm, even death, for many of them. 71
At the end of 1974, a Senate subcommittee issued a report docu-
menting problems with nursing home care-including relocation
difficulties--entitled Nursing Home Care in the United States: Fail-
ure in Public Policy.1 72
The federal Medicaid statutes contain various safeguards of pa-
tients' welfare, including portions referred to as the Medicaid resi-
167. 257 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
168. Id. at 452.
169. 789 P.2d 423 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
170. Id. at 425.
171. 120 CONG. REC. 25696-701 (1974) (statement of Sen. Percy).
172. SUBCOMMITTEE ON LONG-TERM CARE OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, NuRS-
ING HOME CARE IN THE U. S.: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY, S. REP. No. 93-1420, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 18, n.19 (1974).
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dents' Bill of Rights. The Medicaid program must be administered
in a manner that promotes the "best interests" of patients. 173 In
addition, residents may not be transferred except for medical rea-
sons, or for the welfare of the patient or other patients, or for non-
payment. 174 Furthermore, patients must be given notice and the
opportunity for a hearing before their benefits can be reduced or
terminated.1 75 Additionally, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987 (OBRA) refined existing regulations regarding the
transfer of nursing home patients.17 6
2. State
Many states have enacted legislation to address the problems of
nursing home patients, including relocation. Ten states plus the
District of Columbia actually mention transfer trauma in their stat-
utes.177 Most state laws are narrowly tailored to remedy specific
problems, but a few states attempt to ensure the best possible treat-
ment of elderly patients in all phases of long-term care.
Rhode Island addresses the problem of discrimination against
Medicaid patients-who may be impermissibly transferred when
their personal finances are exhausted to make room for private-pay
patients-with the following rule:
Every patient who has been a resident of a nursing home which
participates in Rhode Island's medical assistance program and
has made payments from private funds for at least 6 months
shall, upon depletion of personal funds, be permitted to remain
as a resident of said nursing home at the rate of payment to be
paid by the department of social and rehabilitation services.178
Similarly, the Illinois Department of Public Aid is authorized to
continue paying for care of Medicaid recipients who live in a home
that voluntarily withdraws from participation in the program.'79
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c) (1993) (Medicare); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c) (1993) (Medicaid).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1992).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(2)(A) (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(2)(A) (1993); 42 C.F.R.
§ 442.311 (1991).
175. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1992).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992).
177. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1325, 1336.2, 1556, 1568.073, 1569.54, 1770,
1770.5, 1771 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1-120, 25-3-108 (West 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-231, 17a-234, 19a-541, 19a-545 (West 1990); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-1412, 32-1435 (1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7932, 7934 (West 1992); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21776 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.071 (West 1992);
Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 198.112, 630.775 (Vernon 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-5, 26:2H-8
(West 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. § 7207 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 50.03, 50.05 (West 1990).
178. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.5-24 (1985).
179. ILL. REG. § 4.1405 (1979).
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Connecticut requires adequate planning prior to discharge. 8' A
number of states have "anti-dumping" laws designed to prevent
nursing homes from sending patients to acute-care hospitals and
then refusing to readmit them when the health crisis has passed. 8'
An example of a comprehensive legislative scheme is provided
by the California Health and Safety Code. Section 1325 states:
"The legislature finds and declares that the transfer trauma which
accompanies the abrupt and involuntary transfer of patients from
one nursing home to another should be avoided when reasonable
alternatives exist." The statue goes on to provide for the appoint-
ment of a receiver by the state Department of Health Services if
continued operation by the licensee would present a danger to the
patients. Other sections of the California Health and Safety Code
promulgate stringent requirements and procedures for patient
transfers, including pre-move evaluations of the patients' health sta-
tus, notice, arrangements for future care, counseling when needed
(as determined by the department), and the formulation of a reloca-
tion plan for any ten or more residents likely to be transferred be-
cause of decertification or any other change in provider status. All
of the statutes specify that efforts must be made to minimize trans-
fer trauma.18 2
Illinois has adopted comprehensive transfer laws that provide
for written notice, opportunity for a hearing, a right of appeal, and
many other aspects of involuntary transfers and discharges.1 8 3
Michigan also now has a broad legislative scheme covering this
area. 184
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to acknowledge the se-
riousness of transfer trauma in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing
Center, the phenomenon now appears to be increasingly accepted as
genuine and significant. In its 1989 publication on nursing home
law, the Practicing Law Institute stated that "[t]ransfer trauma is
now a generally recognized phenomenon that must be considered in
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19d-535 (West 1992).
181. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-537(a)(1), 19a-537(d) (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.21777 (1992).
182. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1336.2, 1556, 1568.073, 1569.54 (West
1990).
183. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 111 1/2, §§ 4151-101 to 4153-803 (Smith-Hurd 1981).
184. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 333.21773 - .21777 (1992).
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transfer decisions."'1 85 Nevertheless, legal responses to the problem
vary widely, so patients and their advocates as well as facility opera-
tors may still have difficulty in securing judicial assistance. For ex-
ample, Wisconsin attempted to adopt a "variance" plan under
which, in certain circumstances, patients could remain in a facility
even though a transfer to a different level of care had been recom-
mended. In one such instance, a terminal patient was permitted to
stay in the facility where he and his wife lived so that they could be
together until he died. The federal Health Care Financing Admin-
istration (HCFA), however, did not approve of this arrangement,
and reduced Wisconsin's Medicaid funding in response. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the HCFA decision
was not arbitrary or capricious, and refused to consider transfer
trauma arguments because Wisconsin had not made them at the
administrative level (the district court had remanded for additional
factfinding on the issue).186
The varied treatment that transfer trauma has received in the
courts is indicative of an underlying problem: judges often have no
idea how to deal with evidence from the social sciences (or other
forms of "soft" science such as psychology and psychiatry)."8 7
They may distrust such probabilistic evidence, and deny that data
about how people have behaved in the past has relevance to proving
the facts in the case at bar. As a result of these attitudes, judges
may try to ignore social science data, as the Supreme Court major-
ity did in O'Bannon.18  Alternatively, they may be tempted to use
social science data selectively to bolster the rationale for the out-
come they prefer, as Justice Blackmun did in his O'Bannon concur-
185. Representing the Elderly Client 1989: Nursing Home Issues, 152 Practicing Law In-
stitute (PLI) CRIM. LAw & URBAN PROBS. 73, 94 (1989).
186. Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Social Serv. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1986).
187. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Julius G. Getman, Social Science in Legal Decision-
Making, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 592 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds.,
1986); THE USE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS (1980);
Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes. No Need for a "Better Mousetrap", 32 S. TES. L. REV.
37 (1990); David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding'" Exploring the Em-
pirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); David L.
Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science
and Policy, 38 EMORY LJ. 1005 (1989); David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other
Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence
in Criminal Cases, 66 ORE. L. REV. 19 (1987); Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way
the World Works, 75 IowA L. REV. 1011 (1990); J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a
Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137 (1990); Con-
stance R. Lindman, Note, Sources of Judicial Distrust of Social Science Evidence: A Compari-
son of Social Science and Jurisprudence, 64 IND. L.J. 755 (1989).
188. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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rence. "9 In addition, courts may fail to recognize that scientific
knowledge is cumulative; if a particular theory was rejected by an-
other court years before, that fact may be dispositive, even though
much corroborating evidence may have been added in the interim.
All of these tendencies are exacerbated when the body of knowledge
in the area being considered is inconclusive or conflicting.
A number of proposals have been offered to address this prob-
lem. In the 1970s, the formation of a "science court" was suggested
as a solution for the difficulties presented by all kinds of scientific
evidence-both "hard" and "soft"-for jurors as well as judges. 9
More recently, commentators have advocated the creation of panels
of experts or the use of specially qualified juries in certain cases. '9'
Other proposals include the use of court-appointed experts, height-
ened screening of experts and their testimony through assiduous ju-
dicial application of the federal rules of evidence, bifurcating issues
at trial, and removing some types of cases from the judicial system
entirely. 192
Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker are willing to
leave the evaluation of social science evidence in the hands of
judges, but they have suggested a tripartite system for determining
how such evidence should be treated in a particular case. First,
when courts are using social science to formulate rules of law, they
should treat it as they would legal precedent-as a source of "social
authority," rather than a source of facts. The data should be
presented by the parties in legal briefs, rather than by testimony.
Additionally, the court should be free to conduct its own research.
Judges could weigh the merits of scientific research according to
principles similar to those they use in evaluating legal precedents:
acceptance in the relevant community, valid methods, applicability
to the instant case, and support in other research. Appellate courts
would be not be bound by the trial court's opinion of the scientific
evidence, as they are when the data are regarded as facts, and new
research would enable the courts to reach new conclusions.19 3
The second part of Monahan and Walker's system concerns the
use of social science to resolve particular factual disputes. In such
189. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
190. See James A. Martin, The Prposed "Science Court", 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1058 (1977).
191. See Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative Dispute
Resolution?, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROaS. 171, 173 (1991).
192. Id.
193. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, SocialAuthority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
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cases, the data provide a "social framework" for making factual de-
terminations. 194 Examples might include information about the
general reliability of eyewitnesses, or expert testimony about psy-
chological syndromes such as battered woman syndrome, rape
trauma syndrome, or child sexual abuse syndrome. Social
frameworks are a combination of social authority and fact. 195 Ac-
cording to the model, generalized social framework evidence should
be treated as social authority. Walker and Monahan express confi-
dence that judges are fully capable of evaluating social science
data. 196
Finally, the third use of social science involves studies done for
specific cases, such as studies of consumer perceptions conducted
pursuant to trademark infringement litigation, or other applications
of social science methodology to prove specific facts at issue in a
case. Monahan and Walker call such data "social facts." Research
of this type is also used to decide factual questions rather than to
promulgate rules of law. 197 According to Monahan and Walker,
judicial acceptance of a particular social science methodology as
valid should have precedential effect, but specific factual conclu-
sions based on social science should not. 198
Monahan and Walker's concept of social science as authority is
attractive because it might have the salutary effect of prompting
judges to treat social science with greater respect and resist the
temptation to disregard it. Judges would be compelled to consider
social science evidence with care if it were reversible error to ignore
it or to adopt one party's version of the data without a legitimate
rationale for such preference.
While some extremely complex "hard" scientific data may be
beyond the ken even of judges, this does not appear to be the case
with most social science. Thus, it should not be necessary to have
separate social science courts or panels (except, perhaps, in rare in-
stances involving unusually sophisticated statistical analyses). If,
under Monahan and Walker's system, parties were to brief the is-
sues comprehensively, and judges were to carefully evaluate the in-
formation they were given, it should be possible to arrive at just
194. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science
in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559 (1987).
195. Id. at 587.
196. Id. at 589.
197. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal
Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REv. 877 (1988).
198. Id. at 887.
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decisions. However, for the present we must work within the legal
system as it is.
Some commentators have argued that the legislature-not the
courtroom-is the proper forum in which to address the problem of
transfer trauma. 199 Nevertheless, it would seem that in at least some
cases, legislative remedies will come too slowly for threatened pa-
tients. Of course it should not be necessary to go to court and plead
a parade of horribles in order to obtain the protection and consider-
ation that elderly nursing home residents deserve, but at times it is
necessary. Government agencies may become so obsessed with
their "enforcement credibility" that they lose sight of the welfare of
the patients.2°°
On the other hand, winning the right to stay in a facility that is
truly substandard is probably a Pyrrhic victory. Advocates for the
elderly should be fighting, in the long term, for diligent cooperative
efforts on the part of operators and regulators to maintain high
quality facilities and care, and for laws that require adequate prepa-
ration and counselling of residents who do need to be transferred.
The evidence showing that patients may indeed be better off after
transfer to a superior facility with proper support services has been
largely ignored. Like the blind men in the fable, legislators, govern-
ment administrators, and elder advocates must see the "big pic-
ture." They must recognize both that poorly planned and executed
involuntary moves can be extremely harmful to elderly patients,
and also that well-planned and smoothly implemented reloca-
tions-moves that let patients feel they are in control-can promote
health and enhance life.
199. See e.g., Elias S. Cohen, Legislative and Educational Alternatives to a Judicial Rem-
edyfor the Transfer Trauma Dilemma, I1 AM. J. LAW & MED. 405 (1986); Elias S. Cohen,
Legal Issues in "Transfer Trauma" and Their Impact, 21 GERONTOLOGIST 520 (1981); Janet
M. Robert, Note, Involuntary Relocation of Nursing Home Residents and Transfer Trauma,
24 ST. LOUIS L. J. 758, 782-83 (1981).
200. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Harris, et al., supra note 136, at 63-64; Respondent's
Brief at 13-16, O'Bannon (No. 78-1318), quoting district court bench opinion and order.
("[P]eople are much more interested in sustaining previously stated positions... than they
are in actually carrying out the very beneficial program having to do with nursing homes."
Id. at 14.)
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